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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Was the trial court's authority limited to granting or denying the relief requested in 
Defendant's timely Rule 59 Motion or did the Trial Court have the authority to enter additional 
findings, inconsistent with those requested by Defendant, upon considering Defendant's Rule 59 
Motion? If so, should the additional findings entered by the Court in this matter on May 30, 
1997 be sustained on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Trial Court retained the authority to enter additional findings is a question of 
law which is given no special deference. Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "Findings of fact . . . shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Therefore, the standard of review for the trial 
court's Findings of Fact, assuming the Appellant has complied with the procedure mandated 
when challenging the trial court's findings, is whether they are "clearly erroneous." 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Plaintiff has no objection to the Defendant's statement of Issue No. 2. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review, as cited by the Defendant, has been correctly stated. 
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ISSUE NO. 3 
Did the Trial Court abuse it's discretion when it considered the Defendant's separate 
property in reaching it's decision to award to the Plaintiff a greater share of the marital estate? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Plaintiff concedes that the Defendant has correctly stated the appropriate standard of 
review for Issue No. 3. 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Plaintiff has no objection to the Defendant's statement of Issue No. 4. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff concurs in the Defendant's statement of the appropriate standard of review with 
reference to this issue. 
ISSUE NO. 5 
In dividing the parties' assets, should the trial court have considered the Mountain 
Meadows Ranch, which had been deeded to the Defendant prior to the parties' divorce and which 
the Defendant acknowledged he understood he would receive as his share of his deceased 
mother's estate ,where probate of the estate had not been completed at the time of trial and there 
was a possible defect in chain of title which had, since trial, been remedied? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant's statement of the appropriate standard of review on 
this issue. The issue is not whether the Court had jurisdiction over the Ranch. The issue is 
whether the asset was a " right that has accrued during the marriage to a present or future 
benefit." Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, the 
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appropriate standard of review is whether the trial court abused it's discretion in considering that 
asset in it's ultimate award of marital property. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. 8 30-3-5 (1995) 
(l)When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. . . . " 
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony; 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at 
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a) . . . 
(g)(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the 
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court 
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
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Utah Code Annotated S 78-45-7.5(7) 
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar back-
grounds in the community. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be 
waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
The completed text of the above statutes are included in the Addendum to this 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on March 2,1957. They separated in early January of 1995. 
During the parties marriage they had acquired relatively substantial assets, including some 
real estate. The assets which formed the bulk of the property owned by the parties at the time of 
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their divorce can be traced to 40 acres of real property given to the parties from the Defendant's 
parents in February of 1975 or the Defendant's share of his mother's estate. Some of that 40 
acres had been sold and some of the property had been reacquired by the parties through 
litigation, including foreclosure. The parties had built a home on part of the 40 acres. The 
balance of that 40 acre parcel still owned by Plaintiff and Defendant at the time of trial, 
approximately 22 acres, had a stipulated value at the time of trial of $836,000.00. This property 
is referred to as the development property. Other assets included the home built by the parties 
during the marriage, a building lot acquired by the parties in February of 1985, automobiles, 
tangible personal property, a retirement benefit with a gross value of approximately $69,380.00 
on the date it was liquidated by the Defendant, a condominium purchased by the Plaintiff after 
the parties separated, and a business which had generated profit at one time but which, at the time 
of trial, was considered to be a substantial liability. During the parties' separation the Defendant 
had also acquired an interest in a new business with his then girlfriend, an asset which the court 
found to have no value at the time of trial. 
As a result of the death of the Defendant's mother in 1991, the Defendant also became 
entitled to receive a portion of her estate. The Mountain Meadows Ranch, part of the Defendant's 
share of her estate, was deeded to him during the parties' marriage but apparently there was a 
defect in the chain of title that was not cured until after trial. The Mountain Meadows Ranch had 
a value of $775,000.00. Although Plaintiff had worked on that property during the parties' 
marriage, assisting in the farming operations, she did not assert a claim to ownership of the 
property at the time of trial. 
During the parties' marriage they had also acquired substantial debt, a large portion of 
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which was related to operation of the family business, Hi Desert Marine, and the balance having 
been used to purchase assets or pay legal expenses. 
During the parties' marriage the Plaintiff had been primarily a homemaker and had few if 
any marketable skills. The only employment that she had had outside the home was to work 
briefly as a sales associate with JC Penney or the local college bookstore during the Christmas 
rush or at the beginning of the school year. Defendant, on the other hand, had worked outside the 
home during the parties' marriage as a school teacher and was within three years of retirement 
when he voluntarily resigned his employment and withdrew his accumulated retirement benefits 
at or near the date he was granted a bifurcated Decree of Divorce. 
At the time of trial the Defendant was not employed by any third person. His primary 
income generating efforts were focused on the two businesses acquired during the marriage, 
II. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce in this matter on May 31,1995 (R. 002).. 
A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered on September 8, 1995 (R. 114). Trial was 
conducted on October 10 and 11, 1996. 
The Court's "Judgement in Re: Alimony, Property Division, Debt Allocation, and 
Attorney's Fees" was entered on March 3, 1997 (R. 407). On March 13, 1997, Defendant filed a 
Motion to (1) Amend or Make Additional Findings, (2) Amend or Alter Judgement, and (3) for a 
New Trial (R. 416). In response Plaintiff filed a Motion to Supplement the Judgement on March 
19,1997 (R. 431). In response to the parties' motions, Amended Findings of Fact and an 
Amended Judgement were entered on May 6,1997 (R. 501-515). 
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III. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court entered a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce in this matter on September 8, 1995 
and an Amended Judgement regarding all the other issues on March 6, 1997. Motions were filed 
with reference to that Judgement and the trial court's findings. With the exception of including 
legal descriptions of real property in the Judgement, the Judgement was not thereafter altered. 
However, additional Findings of Fact were made. 
The trial court awarded to the Defendant his inherited property, the Mountain Meadows 
Ranch, and a substantial amount of personal property. The Court awarded Plaintiff the marital 
home, her condominium and the building lot. The Defendant was ordered to pay the marital debt 
so that Plaintiffs assets would be debt free. The Court also ordered that the 22 acres of 
development property be sold, with the proceeds divided equally between the parties. The 
Defendant was ordered to pay alimony to the Plaintiff with the amount to reduce upon sale of the 
development property. Each party was ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and Plaintiff were married on March 2, 1957 (R. 113; 800). At that time the 
Plaintiff was employed at a drug store and the Defendant worked at a turkey farm (R. 800). After 
the marriage the Defendant was very upset about the Plaintiff working and so Plaintiff did not 
continue to work after the marriage (R. 801). The Defendant wanted Plaintiff to stay home and 
take care of the children and so that is what she did; she stayed home and took care of the 
children (R. 801). 
When the parties first married they lived in the St. George, Utah area (R. 801). The 
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parties lived in Cedar City, Utah for two years while the Defendant was going to school, during 
which time he would go to Las Vegas and work construction in the Summer so the parties would 
have enough money to get through the year (R. 802) In approximately 1962 the Defendant 
obtained a teaching job in California and the parties were in California for approximately 12 
years while the Defendant worked as a teacher, principal and acting superintendent (R. 802-803). 
The parties returned to Utah because the Defendant's father needed their help on the ranch and 
because the Defendant had always wanted to come back to the St. George area (R. 803). 
In 1975 a 40 acre parcel of property in the Dixie Downs area in St. George was deeded to 
the Plaintiff and Defendant from the Defendant's parents (Exhibit 6). The parties lived in a little 
trailer on the 40 acres while they were building their house (R. 804). After they returned to Utah 
Defendant tried various jobs. Then, in approximately 1978, he started teaching for the 
Washington County School District (R. 502,804). 
The marital home was built on the edge of that property (R. 805) and segregated into its 
own legal description in January of 1995 (Exhibit 8). 
After the parties moved back to St. George the Defendant helped maintain the property 
owned by his parents at Mountain Meadows (R. 805-806). The parties took care of the cattle on 
the ranch, moving the cattle twice a year from the Summer division to the Winter. On one year 
they rode horses on a three day cattle drive. At other times the loaded cattle on a truck and 
brought them back (R. 807). Defendant worked the ground and plowed it. The Plaintiff rode 
with the Defendant on the tractors and worked with him (R. 806-807). The Defendant followed 
the Plaintiff when he was disking and would do the planting and would drive the vehicle while 
they were loading the hay. Plaintiff worked right along with the Defendant (R. 807). The parties 
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had spent the Summer months working the ranch while they were living in California (R. 809). 
When they returned to Utah, Plaintiff and Defendant worked on the ranch in the Summer months, 
and, in the Winter, they would travel back and forth to work on the ranch because the Defendant 
had to be to work, teaching school, the next morning (R. 808). 
Plaintiff continued to help on the ranch until 1995 (R. 809). During the marriage the 
Plaintiff worked periodically outside of the home at JC Penney's during the rush season at 
Christmas for three years (R. 816). She also was acquainted with the manager at the Dixie 
College Bookstore and worked at the bookstore the first of each Quarter to run the registers for a 
number of years for three to six days at a time (R. 816-817). Plaintiff was not employed outside 
the home other than those part-time jobs (R. 817). 
At the time of trial the Plaintiff was employed part-time at JC Penney working 
approximately 27 hours a week making $5.00 per hour with no benefits (R. 818). At that time 
she had living expenses of approximately $2,021.00 per month without a car or mortgage 
payment (R. 823-824, Exhibit 34). 
While the parties were separated, during the Summer of 1995, the Defendant and his 
girlfriend, Suzanne, investigated and eventually set up a business known as Arma-Coating (R. 
661-662). The business was started in approximately July of 1995 (R. 661). The Defendant and 
Suzanne had been investigating the business for approximately 2 months prior to that time (R. 
662). The Plaintiff was notified before the Arma-Coating business was set up (R. 814). 
However, the Plaintiff was never involved in setting up the business (R. 662) and was not 
involved in any of the operation of the business (R. 662). When initially informed about the 
business Plaintiff told Defendant she did not want anything to do with the business even though 
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the Defendant informed her that it was his understanding that the business would be part hers (R. 
815). The Defendant went ahead with the business despite Plaintiffs protest (R. 816). 
On August 29,1995, the Court entered Temporary Orders which provided, among other 
things, as follows: " 9. Each party is restrained and enjoined from transferring or disposing of any 
property he or she has in his or her possession unless the other party consents to the 
disposition.." (R. 109). 
During November of 1995 the Defendant cashed in his retirement account (R. 669, 813). 
The Plaintiff was not aware the Defendant was going to cash in his retirement account until after 
he had done so (R. 813). Thereafter, on or about December 22, 1995, the Plaintiff did agree that 
the Defendant could use $55,000.00 of the retirement to pay some of the loan obtained to start 
the Arma-Coating business in order to facilitate his borrowing $130,000.00 to assist Plaintiff in 
the purchase of her new condominium (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 32). 
Despite the investment of $55,000.00 of loan proceeds (R. 666), $30,000.00 of which had 
been paid off with the Defendant's retirement fund (R. 505), at the time of trial the Arma-
Coating business had no value (R. 505). 
The down payment for purchase of the Plaintiffs condominium came from the parties 
income tax refund (R. 812). Plaintiff testified that Defendant agreed that she could use the 
income tax refund for that purpose (R. 812, 890-893). 
During the parties' marriage they had acquired a business known as "High Desert Marine" 
(R. 639-640). Both parties participated in operation of the business (R. 739). The business had 
earned a profit in 1993 (R. 645, Exhibit 15) but had lost money in 1994 and 1995 (R. 646). 
Although the business had a negative value of $43,578.08 in December of 1995 (R. 592), when 
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the Plaintiff last worked in the business (R. 788), the trial court found that at the time of trial, on 
October 10 and 11, 1996, the business had a negative value of $150,000.00 (R. 504, 505). The 
business was not a profitable operation (R. 505). However, the Defendant was "working hard to 
make the business profitable" (R. 505) and believed that it could be profitable (R. 646, 648). The 
business supported the parties' son and his family and provided money to Defendant with which 
he paid the temporary support which had been ordered by the court (R. 505). 
After the parties' divorce, in November or December of 1996, the Defendant and the 
woman who became his wife, Suzanne, purchased a 1996 Ford extended cab pick-up truck (R. 
697). The monthly payment of approximately $625.00 has been made by the Arma -Coating 
business (R. 704). 
Although the Defendant was ordered to sell the Corvette in the Temporary Orders entered 
by the Court on August 29, 1995 (R. 105), the Defendant's only effort to sell the Corvette was to 
place a sign in the window (R. 711) and the Corvette had not been sold at the time of trial (R. 
710). Although at one time the Defendant testified that the Corvette was his primary source of 
transportation (R. 712), he also testified that he had available for his use, until the Summer of 
1996, the Ford Taurus that he had inherited (R. 712)and the new truck purchased through the 
Arma-Coating business (R. 711). The trial court determined, at trial, that the corvette, which is a 
drain upon the parties' assets, is an unaffordable luxury with its high insurance and monthly 
payments, and ordered it sold (R. 504). 
The Defendant's mother died in 1991 (R. 910). From his mother's estate the Defendant 
inherited the Mountain Meadows Ranch (R. 649). That ranch had a value of $775,000.00 for 
purpose of trial (R. 506, Exhibit 3, and see page 10 of Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact, 
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attached in the Addendum). The property had been deeded to the Defendant in February of 1995 
(R. 650). Although there was a problem with the chain of title the Defendant understood that he 
would receive that property (R. 651-652) and expected to receive it (R. 925). Defendant did 
receive a second Quit Claim Deed to the property which was recorded on April 15, 1997 (R. 
522). 
The parties separated in January of 1995 (R. 777) and Plaintiff filed for divorce on May 
31st of that year (R. 002). 
At the time of filing of the Plaintiffs Complaint 22 acres remained of the development 
property which had been conveyed to the parties by the Defendant's parents in 1975 (R. 591). 
The gross value of the 22 acres of development property was $836,000.00 at the time of trial (R. 
591). The building lot on the Black Hill purchased by the parties in 1985 had a value of 
$35,000.00 (R. 591) and the parties' home on West Lytle Drive, which had been built by them on 
property given to them by the Defendant's parents, had a value of $149,500.00 (R. 590). In 
addition, the Plaintiff had acquired a condominium with a value of $135,000.00 during the 
parties separation. The home and condominium were subject to three debts in the stipulated 
amounts of $20,009.83, $16,339.58, and $149, 574.69. (R. 596). 
At the time of trial the Court found the value of the tangible personal property awarded to 
each party to be $16, 725.00 to Plaintiff and $54,000.00 to Defendant (R. 507). 
The Mountain Meadows Ranch is not a money making operation (R. 677, 678). It is more 
in the nature of a "hobby" (R. 503). 
After the parties had separated, while the Defendant was maintaining a relationship with 
his soon to be spouse, the Defendant voluntarily took a one year leave of absence from his 
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employment as a teacher in the Washington County School District (R. 674), just three years 
short of qualifying for monthly retirement benefits (R. 669-670). 
The Defendant attended a faculty meeting for the 1996-1997 school year (R. 722). A 
teaching job was available for him (R. 722). However, the Defendant requested an additional 
leave of absence (R. 724). When told that he would not be granted an additional leave of 
absence, the Defendant quit (R. 725). The Defendant did not mention any health problems that 
would interfere with his work (R. 724). The only factor that the Defendant mentioned to his 
supervisor when he resigned was the pending divorce (R. 724). 
In 1994, the last year the Defendant worked full-time as a school teacher prior to the 
divorce, the Defendant earned $50,997.55 (R. 674). The Defendant worked an extended 
schedule that year (R. 675). He could have worked a traditional school year (R. 677). The 
extended school year income is approximately 25% more then the traditional school year salary 
(R. 677). Based on those numbers the Defendant's income would have been $4,100.70 per 
month for 1994 and would have been approximately $3,300.00 for the traditional school year. 
The trial court found that the Defendant is capable of earning approximately $3,000.00 per 
month (R. 508). 
Although the Defendant had a heart attack in 1988 (R. 674) the Defendant had worked 
several years after that surgery, teaching school (R. 676). 
At trial the Plaintiff made no claim to the Mountain Meadows Ranch but did insist that 
that asset be considered by the Court in equitably dividing the remaining assets of the parties (R. 
601). 
The Plaintiff claimed, as a grounds for divorce, that the Defendant had maintained a 
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relationship with a women not his wife and that created an irreconcilable difference during the 
marriage (R. 002). The Court did not specifically address that issue but found, instead, that the 
Plaintiff had not proven that the Defendant had committed adultery (R. 504). 
Although the trial court found that the Defendant had made a substantial down payment on 
the Plaintiffs condominium with the parties' retirement (R. 503) in fact, no evidence was 
presented as to the amount of any down payment. The evidence presented at trial indicated that 
the only substantial down payment on the condominium came from the parties' tax return (R. 
745). The balance was financed by Defendant (R. 665). The reason that the Defendant's 
retirement was associated with the purchase of the condominium was that the Defendant used a 
portion of the retirement to pay down the Arma-Coating debt so that he could qualify for the loan 
to purchase the condominium (R. 665). The money from the retirement was not used to purchase 
the condominium (R. 749). Therefore, the Defendant received the full benefit of the $56,000.00 
withdrawn from the retirement, and the Plaintiff received nothing tangible from that asset. 
Prior to the trial the Defendant had purchased a ring for Suzanne, the woman who became 
his wife. He traded a $6,800.00 receivable at the family owned business, High Desert Marine, 
for that ring (R. 680). 
The trial court determined that the reasonable rental value of the marital home awarded to 
the Plaintiff was $850.00 per month (R. 508). The trial court also found that the Defendant had 
the ability to produce income of $3,000.00 per month and had expenses of $2,400.00 per month 
(R. 508). The Court awarded the Plaintiff alimony in the amount of $600.00 per month, to be 
reduced to the amount of $300.00 per month after sale of the 22 acres. 
In addition to personal property, the Court awarded the building lot, home on Lytle Drive 
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and the condominium to the Plaintiff (R. 513). 
The Court awarded the Defendant personal property in his possession (R. 514), which the 
Court found had a value of $54,000.00 (R. 507). The Court awarded the Defendant the business 
known as High Desert Marine, which the Court found had a negative value of $150,000.00 (R. 
505) and ordered that the Defendant pay the debts which were secured by property awarded to 
the Plaintiff, including the mortgage on the condominium of $149,574.69, the mortgage on the 
marital home of $20,900.83 and home equity line on the marital home with a value of $16,039.15 
(R. 515). In addition, the Court ordered that the Defendant pay the debt secured by the 
Defendant's Corvette, which had not been sold prior to trial, in the amount of $9,762.37 and the 
accountant fees incurred by the parties in the amount of $10,546.00 (R. 507, 515). The Court 
ordered that the 22 acres of development property be sold and that the proceeds be divided 
equally between the parties. (R. 5515). 
The Court did not identify the Mountain Meadows Ranch in its division of marital real 
estate but did award that asset to the Defendant (R. 512-513). 
Neither party was awarded attorney's fees (R. 516). 
Judgement was originally entered on March 3, 1997 (R. 407). On March 13th the 
Defendant filed a Motion to (1) Amend or Make Additional Findings, (2) to Amend or Alter 
Judgement and (3) for a New Trial. (R. 416). While that Motion was pending, Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Supplement the Record (R. 431). 
At a hearing on those Motions the Court denied the Defendant's Motions but found that 
additional findings were appropriate and granted the Plaintiffs request that supplemental 
findings be entered (R. 1123). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Once the Defendant filed a timely Rule 59 Motion, the trial court retained jurisdiction to 
amend and supplement its findings. The trial court was not bound to only grant or deny the 
Defendant's Motion. If the trial court became aware of deficiencies in the findings prior to entry 
of a final order, the Court had the authority to amend it's findings as it saw fit. 
Since Defendant has failed to "marshal the evidence," as required by the prior decisions of 
the appellate courts in this State, the facts as found by the trial court are presumed supported by 
the record and evidence. 
The additional findings by the Court are consistent with the evidence presented. The 
Defendant did voluntarily terminate his employment on the eve of full retirement (within three 
years). His doing so deprived Plaintiff of the benefit of his income, as much as nearly 
$51,000.00 per year, since his post resignation income has been, for the most part, limited to 
benefits from the businesses in the form of use of an automobile and trades as well as enough 
cash to fulfill his court ordered obligations. The Defendant's voluntarily terminating his 
employment also resulted in his losing the full benefit of the retirement account that he would 
have acquired had he continued working three more years. That finding by the Court is entirely 
consistent with the evidence presented. 
The trial court's finding that the Defendant liquidated his retirement account in violation 
of an existing Order is consistent with the facts. A court Order existed prohibiting the Defendant 
from disposing of any assets. Despite that Order, in November of 1995 the Defendant liquidated 
his retirement account without notifying the Plaintiff in advance. Not until December of 1995 
did the Plaintiff and Defendant reached any type of agreement with reference to that liquidation. 
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And, even then, Plaintiff did not receive any of the retirement funds. Most of those funds were 
used to pay a debt incurred in conjunction with Defendant's opening a business against the 
Plaintiffs will but while the parties were still married. The trial court found that that asset had no 
value. In light of the fact that the business into which those assets had been contributed had no 
value at the time of trial, the trial court's finding that the Defendant had dissipated almost all the 
retirement account was correct. The trial court's finding that, in light of the dissipation, Plaintiff 
should receive a greater share of the marital estate, is also consistent with the evidence presented. 
The trial court's finding that the Plaintiff was unable to support herself at the standard of 
living to which she was entitled with the amount of alimony awarded and her own earned income 
was correct. That finding is clearly consistent with the evidence. The trial court correctly found 
that the Plaintiff could not meet her financial needs unless she received alimony and all of the 
rental income from the marital home. 
The trial court's finding that the Mountain Meadows Ranch, inherited by Defendant 
during the marriage, ought to be considered in the ultimate award of marital property is 
consistent with the case law in this state and consistent with the facts and equities of this case in 
light of, among other things, the value of that asset and the parties' combined efforts to manage 
that ranch during their marriage. 
The trial court clearly did not consider the ranch marital property. The marital property is 
listed in paragraph 32 of the findings whereas the Mountain Meadows Ranch is separately 
identified at paragraph 33 of the findings. In fact, the Court even found that the Plaintiff had not 
acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows Ranch because of work she performed on 
the property during the parties' marriage (R. next page after 508). 
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The Court's division of property is equitable in light of, among other things, the 
Defendant's substantial inherited property and the parties' maintaining of that property during 
most of their marriage, the Defendant's dissipation of assets, including the retirement, the 
Defendant's voluntary termination of his employment, the Plaintiffs lack of employment skills, 
the Plaintiffs financial need, and the substantial decrease in the value of the family business, 
High Desert Marine, from the time the Plaintiff was last involved in that business until the date 
of trial. 
While the Court should not automatically give a smaller portion of the marital estate to a 
party in order to mathematically offset the other party's inheritance, the Court clearly can take 
into account the existence of substantial inherited property in determining an equitable award of 
the jointly owned property. 
This Court had jurisdiction over the ranch. This was an asset to which the Plaintiff became 
entitled during the marriage. A technical defect in the chain of title, corrected after trial, does not 
change the fact that the Defendant's interest in that asset accrued during the marriage. 
Alimony was appropriately awarded in this case in light of the Plaintiffs financial need 
and Plaintiffs inability to meet those needs even with the assets awarded to her. Income was 
properly imputed to the Defendant at his ability to produce income in light of his voluntary 
resignation from his employment as a school teacher. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS SHOULD BE SUSTAINED IN LIGHT 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE 
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In order to challenge a trial court's findings, the appellant must "marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous." Maoris and Associates v. Images and Attitude , (319 UAR 33.) (Utah App. 
1997), citing Interwest Const v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996). If the Appellant fails 
to marshal all the evidence, the appellate court should "uphold the trial court's findings of fact." 
Macris and Associates. 319 U.A.R. at 36, citing Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
In this instance, the Defendant has totally failed to marshal the evidence as required. The 
Defendant has merely renewed his argument that the evidence weighs more in his favor and has 
cited to those portions of the record that support his position. This approach does not comply 
with the requirement of this Court that the Defendant "marshal evidence in support of the 
findings and demonstrate that 'despite such evidence, the factual findings are clearly erroneous.' 
Allred, 893 P.2d at 1090. 
In light of the Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the trial court's factual findings 
should be assumed by this court to be correct. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER THE FINDINGS AND 
JUDGEMENT IN THIS CASE AND HAD AUTHORITY TO AMEND AND 
SUPPLEMENT ITS FINDINGS UNTIL ITS RULING BECAME FINAL. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may amend it's 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgement accordingly upon motion of 
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a party made no later than 10 days after entry of judgement. Filing a motion under Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "suspends the finality of the judgement.. /'Anderson v. 
Schwendiman. 764 P.2d 999, (Utah App. 1988) citing Bailev v. Sound Lab. Inc. 694 P.2d 1043 
(Utah 1984) and TransAmerica Cash Reserve. Inc. v. Hafen. 723 P.2d 425 ( Utah 1986). 
Pending entry of a final Judgement, the trial court has authority to make additional 
findings or alter its judgement. Therefore, in addition to the general, continuing jurisdiction the 
Court has in domestic matters (See Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (3)) a trial court clearly has 
the authority to alter or amend its findings while the finality of its judgement is suspended and 
until the judgement is final. 
In this case the Defendant's Rule 59 Motion suspended the finality of the judgement. 
When it was brought to the trial court's attention that additional findings may be appropriate the 
trial court agreed and adopted additional findings. Although those findings were not consistent 
with what the Defendant had requested, the trial court is certainly not bound to merely grant or 
deny the relief requested in a Rule 59 Motion if it appears to the trial court that additional 
findings may be appropriate or necessary. In fact, the trial court has a responsibility to make 
appropriate findings in domestic cases (U.R.C.P. Rule 52c). It would be error for the trial court 
to not enter appropriate findings while the matter is still pending at that level. 
III. 
THE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS BY THE COURT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
COURT'S PRIOR FINDINGS AND WITH THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
Without waiving her claim that the trial court's findings are presumed supported by the 
record in light of Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, Plaintiff submits the following 
20 
response to Defendant's attack on the trial court's additional findings. 
A. FINDING NO. 41 
In Finding No. 41 the Court determined that "the Defendant voluntarily terminated his 
employment on the eve of full retirement." The Court had earlier made no finding to the 
contrary. The Court did find that "in 1995 the Defendant took a leave of absence from the 
Washington County School District, but did not return to that employment," (R. 502) and the 
evidence presented at trial clearly supports that finding. The Defendant resigned from his 
employment when he had a job available to him for which he had 29 years of experience. He did 
not mention any health concerns when he terminated. Although he had had heart bi-pass surgery 
in 1988, he had continued working for approximately seven years before he quit his job. 
The Defendant terminated his employment within three years of retirement. In light of the 
age of the parties and Defendant's work history, that was on the "eve of full retirement." 
The trial court's finding that Defendant's voluntary termination of employment deprived 
the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income is clearly consistent with the evidence presented at trial. 
The Defendant was capable of earning nearly $51,000.00 per year. By terminating his 
employment that income is not available to the Plaintiff to assist her with her living expenses. 
Had Defendant continued to work and earned between $3,000.00 and $4,200.00 per month, he 
would have been in a position to contribute a greater share of his income toward the Plaintiffs 
financial support. 
As it is, the trial court found that Defendant could only contribute $600.00 per month 
toward Plaintiffs support based on, his living expenses and imputation and of income to him at 
the lowest level he could have been earning. The Defendant's terminating his employment only 
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three years prior to qualifying for monthly retirement benefits did deprive the Plaintiff of the 
benefit of the Defendant's retirement account. Had he worked until he became entitled to full 
retirement benefits the Plaintiff would have been entitled to nearly one-half of those retirement 
benefits. By terminating his employment early, withdrawing his retirement account without 
consulting the Plaintiff in advance, and using most of that money to pay a debt incurred by him in 
order to begin a new business with the woman who eventually became his wife, Defendant 
deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of her share of his retirement account. The only benefit 
Plaintiff actually received from that retirement account was the Defendant's use of those funds to 
pay off another debt he had incurred, from which the Plaintiff derived absolutely no benefit, in 
order to qualify for a loan to purchase the Plaintiffs condominium, an asset Defendant claims is 
now a liability (See Appellant's Brief at page 12). 
B. FINDING 42 
The trial court correctly found that the Defendant violated an existing court Order when he 
liquidated his retirement account. 
The retirement account was liquidated in November of 1995. The Plaintiff did not know 
that the Defendant had liquidated his retirement account until he had done so. The court Order 
required that the parties agree before dissipating or disposing of any asset. After the fact 
Plaintiff cooperated with the Defendant in reference to the retirement account which had already 
been liquidated and no sanctions were requested or imposed by the trial court for the Defendant's 
violation of its Order. However, that does not change the fact that the trial court's Order had 
been violated. 
No evidence was presented at trial with reference to the amount of the retirement funds 
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used to assist the Plaintiff with reference to acquisition of her condominium except Defendant's 
acknowledgement that the "money from [the] retirement was actually not used to purchase the 
condominium . ." (R. 749). Most of the funds were clearly used to pay a debt incurred in 
conjunction with Defendant's opening the Arma-Coating business against the Plaintiffs will 
while the parties were still married. This asset, according to the Court, had no value at the time of 
the trial. 
The Defendant had taken an asset worth $69,000.00 and, with most of that asset, had in 
essence increased his equity in another asset acquired prior to the divorce which was worth 
nothing at the time of trial. 
Defendant dissipated almost all of the retirement account. Under those circumstances and 
in light of the fact that the retirement account was no longer available for division, the trial court 
clearly should have awarded Plaintiff a greater share of the marital estate and did so. 
The trial court made so specific findings with reference to whether Defendant had agreed 
that Plaintiff pay for her condominium with the parties' tax refund. While a specific finding on 
that issue is probably not essential to the trial court's ruling, Plaintiff testified at trial that the 
Defendant was aware of and consented that the Plaintiffs use of the parties' tax refund to make 
the $5,000.00 down payment on that condominium, directly contradicting the Defendant's claim 
in that regard. 
C FINDING 43 
The trial court found that the Plaintiff is unable to support herself at the standard of living 
to which she is entitled with the amount of alimony awarded and her own earned income. With 
alimony of $600.00 per month and her earned income of $540.00 per month the Plaintiff still 
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lacked $881.00 each month in order to meet her financial needs. 
Therefore, that factual finding supports the award of the parties' marital home to the 
Plaintiff, free and clear of any debt, so that she could subsidize her other income with unearned, 
rental income in order to meet her financial needs. 
The trial court found, correctly, that the Defendant was able to meet his financial needs 
with the income he was capable of making, even if he were to pay $600.00 per month alimony to 
the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff, upon sale of the 22 acres, would have additional funds with which to support 
herself and, therefore, would not be in need of the $600.00 in alimony at that time. The trial 
court properly considered that fact when it ordered that alimony reduce to $300.00 upon sale of 
the development property. 
Defendant's claim that the Plaintiff would receive 97.7% of the marital estate ignores the 
fact that the Defendant dissipated an asset with a gross .value of $69,000.00 and a net value of 
$56,000.00 after taxes by liquidating his retirement account in violation of a court Order. His use 
of a substantial portion of that money to retire a debt incurred in order to set up a business that 
had no value at the time of the divorce at the time of trial cannot be ignored. In essence, 
Defendant had already received and consumed a substantial amount of the marital estate when 
the matter came to trial. That asset clearly needs to be considered. In addition, the Defendant 
used a receivable from High Desert Marine to acquire a $6,800.00 ring for his present spouse. 
If those assets are factored in, the award to Plaintiff is approximately 90% of the marital 
estate, not 97.75%. 
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D. FINDING 44 
The trial court's finding that the Plaintiff did not technically acquire a financial interest in 
the Mountain Meadows Ranch because of work she performed on that property during the 
parties' marriage and while it was still titled in the name of the Defendant's parents is not 
disputed. The trial court made no indication that the ranch was deeded to the Plaintiff as some 
sort of compensation. All that the court found was that the Plaintiff had contributed toward the 
parties' assets, including property the Defendant eventually inherited, and that her contribution 
toward that asset ought to be considered. This is not an issue of compensation; Plaintiff does not 
claim that she is entitled to be paid for the work that she performed. This is an issue of equitable 
division of marital assets in light of the Defendant having inherited a substantial asset as to which 
the Plaintiff contributed her time and effort during the marriage. 
The trial court's award to the Plaintiff of a greater share of the marital estate does not in 
effect award her an interest in the property inherited by the Defendant because a trial court is not 
required to divide marital assets with mathematical equality. The Court is bound to equitably 
divide marital assets. In support of its judgement the Court specifically found as follows; 
7. During the term of the marriage, the Plaintiff raised the family, assisted the Defendant 
on the ranch, kept the house, bottled fruit, helped in the ranching operation, and generally 
supported both parties' economic efforts in making the family operation work" (R. 502). 
The Court also found as follows: 
(9). "However on top of those gifts [from the Defendant's parents], their joint efforts of 
producing income and, also, in non-dollar producing efforts, but valuable efforts, contributed by 
the Plaintiff, Mrs. Lytle, added to the values produced by the gifts and inheritance from the 
Defendant's father and mother" (R. 503). 
The trial court clearly did not divide the parties' marital estate based on a strict 
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mathematical formula and is not required to do so. See Teece v. Teece. 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 
1986). The Court is required to equitably divide the assets. In this case, the Court did precisely 
that. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's decision in this case is contrary to the the decision 
of the Supreme Court in Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). However, that is 
not this case. In Mortensen. the trial court had ruled that shares of stock acquired by the husband 
were a marital asset. In light of that ruling the parties reached a stipulation which gave two thirds 
of the value of the remaining property to the wife, including their major asset, the house and lot 
which had been paid for, and the husband received the remaining one-third. The husband 
appealed the trial court's ruling, in essence challenging the trial court's inclusion of the stock, 
which he claimed to be separate property, in the marital estate. 
In analyzing the husband's argument on Appeal, the Supreme Court cited to several cases, 
including Weaver v. Weaver. 442 P.2d 928 (Utah 1968), in which that Court acknowledged that 
it had based it's decision on the 
"oft-repeated rule that under section 30-3-5, there is no fixed rule or formula for the 
division of property, the trial court has wide discretion in property division, and its 
judgement will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be 
demonstrated." Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 306. 
The Court cited several cases, including Weaver, in which circumstances justified 
awarding what would otherwise be one spouse's separate property to the other spouse. 
In Mortensen the Court also cited several cases in which inherited or premarital property 
had been awarded solely to the donee spouse, acknowledging that the Court had found no case 
where a trial court's disposition of gifts or inherited property received during the marriage had 
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been reversed and stated the following: 
" In almost every case, we have emphasized the wide discretion trial courts have in 
property division and have refrained from laying down any general rules for the disposition of 
gifts and inherited property." Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 307. 
The Court discussed the law in other jurisdictions and acknowledged the general rule that 
property acquired by one spouse by gift or inheritance during the marriage should be awarded to 
that spouse. However, the court then discussed the split of authority regarding how the trial court 
should treat the remaining marital property. Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 307. 
The Court cited the rule that "even though donated or inherited property is not subject to 
equitable division, it may properly be considered as a factor in determining what constitutes an 
equitable division of the remaining property." Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 308 and concluded that 
"in Utah, trial courts making "equitable" property divisions pursuant to § 30-3-5 should, in 
accordance with the rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and with the division made 
in many of our own cases, generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift or 
inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, . . ." Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 
308. 
The Court went on to state that" The remaining property should be divided equitably 
between the parties as in other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict mathematical 
equality," Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 308., citing Teece v. Teece. supra. The court advised that the 
trial court should not 
" automatically or arbitrarily [award] the other spouse an equal amount of the remaining 
property which was acquired by their joint efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance. Any 
significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should be based on an 
equitable rationale rather then on the sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts 
or inheritance." Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 308. 
In Mortensen the Supreme Court concluded that the husband was correctly awarded all of 
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his stock, in essence agreeing with his argument that it was his separate property. However, the 
Court went on to state " [E]ven though the stock should have been and was awarded to the 
defendant, the trial court was technically correct in ruling that the stock was not without the 
purview of the court since it was " property" under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5." (Mortensen. 760 
P.2d at 308). Clearly, a trial court should consider a party's separate property in fashioning its 
equitable award of marital property. 
The Supreme Court in Mortensen then went on to discuss the reasons that an award of 
two-thirds of the remaining marital property to the wife was appropriate. Included in those 
reasons were the fact that, although the parties had a wide disparity in their earnings, the wife had 
waived any claim to alimony and the fact that the wife was not awarded any part of the husband's 
retirement, even though there was no evidence presented at trial with reference to the value of 
that retirement. In view of the factors identified, including the disparity in the parties' earning 
ability, the wife's waiver of alimony, and the wife's having received no interest in her husband's 
retirement, the Supreme Court stated that "it would not have been inequitable for the trial court 
to award plaintiff two-thirds of the remaining property and defendant one-third, giving no weight 
at all to the fact that he received his shares of stock" Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 309. 
In essence, the Supreme Court concluded in Mortensen that awarding the non-donee 
spouse two-thirds of the marital estate was not an abuse of discretion even if the husband's 
separate property had not been considered. Unfortunately, we are not provided any guidance 
from that decision as to what an appropriate division of the property would have been had the 
Court excluded the husband's separate property from the marital estate but considered it as his 
separate property. However, the clear import of that decision is the following: (1) Even though 
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the stock was the husband's separate property it was " property" which should be considered by 
the trial court under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 and (2) a two-thirds/one-third division of property 
is not, per se, an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
The Defendant in this case would have the Court believe that Mortensen stands for the 
propositions that the trial court should (1) ignore the separate property of the parties in fashioning 
an equitable division of the marital estate and (2) divide the marital estate based on a 
mathematical formula of equality, ignoring principles of equity. That is clearly not the rule in 
this jurisdiction. 
IV. 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATE THE DEFENDANT'S 
INHERITANCE AS SEPARATE PROPERTY IS HARMLESS ERROR. AS IT WAS 
CLEARLY THE INTENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE PARTIES THAT THE 
PROPERTY BE TREATED AS SUCH, 
In his opening statement to the Court, Plaintiffs counsel pointed out the following: 
" And although we're not asserting a claim, per se, to the inherited property, it's our 
position that the Court needs to take that property into account in dividing the marital 
estate and hence an equal division of what would otherwise be characterized as marital 
property would be inequitable and the Court should, therefore, award to Mrs. Lytle the 
greater portion of the marital property than is ordered to the defendant." (R. 601). 
In its findings the trial court indicated an intention to treat the Defendant's inheritance 
different from the other property. In its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the 
marital real property is listed at paragraph 32 (R. 505, 506) while the Mountain Meadows Ranch, 
the Defendant's inherited property, is listed separately in paragraph 33 (R. 506). In addition, the 
trial court clearly indicated its intent and understanding at a hearing subsequent to trial in which 
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it stated 
" My understanding it was that it was the understanding of the parties- - and it was not 
hotly litigated, because everybody seemed to make the assumption - - that Mr. Lytle would 
receive the ranch and the water rights and that that was his inheritance from his parents; 
that that was their testamentary intent; that the parties were assuming he would receive 
the ranch. And Mrs. Lytle made absolutely no claim to any fee or other title interest in 
that property because it was to be Mr. Lytle's property." (R. 1039). 
There is no question that the ranch was considered Mr. Lytle's separate property both by 
the parties and by the trial court. 
The issue then, is whether the trial court abused it's discretion in considering the 
Defendant's ownership of the Mountain Meadows Ranch in fashioning a division of the jointly 
owned property. 
There are a number of factors which the Court may consider in determining how marital 
property should be divided. In Finlayson v. Finlayson. 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994) the trial 
court had concluded that a portion of the real property was not marital property because the 
donor did not intend to give it to both parties. In analyzing the trial court's decision the Utah 
Court of Appeals noted the general rules with reference to awarding separate property to the 
donee spouse and, citing to Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah App. 1990) quoted Dunn 
as follows: 
" Exceptions to this general rule include whether the property as been co-mingled, whether 
the other spouse by his or her own efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the 
separate property, and whether the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result." 
Finlayson. 874 P.2d at 847. 
Accordingly, a determination that a certain item of property is owned separately by one of 
the spouses does not end the inquiry. The trial court must then determine whether an exception 
to the general rule exists, including " whether the distribution [of all of the property] achieves a 
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fair, just, and equitable result." Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 847. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF A GREATER SHARE OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE TO THE PLAINTIFF ACHIEVES A FAIR. JUST. AND EQUITABLE 
RESULT IN THIS MATTER. 
The Plaintiff worked on the Mountain Meadows Ranch prior to the death of the 
Defendant's father in 1988 and prior to the death of the Defendant's mother, in 1991. The death 
of Defendant's mother, in 1991, entitled Defendant to an interest in the Mountain Meadows 
Ranch. Plaintiff did not claim that that property had been co-mingled or that she had augmented, 
maintained, or protected the separate property once Defendant became entitled to the same. 
Plaintiff, however, does maintain that the trial court properly considered that asset and other 
factors in reaching a fair, just, and equitable result. 
This is a case in which a mathematical formula for a division of the marital estate is not 
appropriate and the trial court should have and properly did consider several factors in reaching 
and equitable, although not an equal, division of marital property. 
The Defendant's inherited property had a value as found by the trial court of $775,000.00, 
consistent with the proposed Findings submitted by Defendant (See Addendum page A5 a copy 
of page 10 of the Defendant's proposed Findings submitted to the trial court in written form, and 
trial Exhibit 3). 
Plaintiff was in need of additional income with which to meet her financial needs, 
justifying the trial court's award to her of the marital home, free and clear of any debt, since the 
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trial court had found that that asset was capable of producing approximately $850.00 per month 
rental income (R. 508). 
Although the businesses awarded to the Defendant had a negative value of $150,000.00 
according to the trial court, Defendant remained adamant that those businesses would become 
profitable. The trial court noted that Defendant had " traded the certainty of employment and 
income stream and retirement benefits for these assets . . because he had made a conscious, 
considerate, learned, and reasonable decision . . [and] that the expectancy of these was clearly 
relied upon Mr. Lytle in making that decision" (R. 1049). 
The Defendant had liquidated the retirement account, clearly a marital asset, in violation 
of a court Order prohibiting disposing of marital assets without first obtaining Plaintiffs consent. 
The Plaintiff did not know that the retirement account had been withdrawn until after the fact. 
She then attempted to reach an agreement regarding the asset. However, that does not change the 
fact that the Defendant's withdrawing of that fund and cashing in the retirement account 
dissipated that asset. Most of the asset was used to pay debts incurred by the Defendant to set up 
a business with his then girlfriend, who later became his wife, while the Plaintiff and Defendant 
were still married. In addition, the Defendant had used marital assets, a receivable from High 
Desert Marine, to buy his new wife a $6,800.00 diamond ring. 
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) the Appellate Court did not determine 
that the trial court's award of the marital home to one party and the other party's inherited 
property, of apparently offsetting value, to him was incorrect. The Court of Appeals stated that 
there were insufficient findings in the record to support the Court's disposition of the marital 
home and the defendant's separate property. In fact, the Court acknowledged that there are 
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"extraordinary situations when equity . . . demands" that the Court award an interest in inherited 
property to the non heir spouse. (Burt. 799 P.2d at 1169). The Court noted that, under the general 
rule, inherited property should be awarded to the donee spouse where no extraordinary 
circumstances are found by the court to exist. However, the Court also acknowledged, citing 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 1276, (Utah App. 1987) the following: 
" The overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable . . that property be 
fairly divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their 
circumstances at the time of the divorce." Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278. 
The Defendant cites Dubois v. Dubois. 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah App. 1973) for the 
proposition that the Court should not even consider the Defendant's inheritance in dividing the 
marital estate. Dubois does not stand for that proposition at all. In Dubois, the Court of Appeals 
did not even address that issue but, in essence, summarily affirmed the trial court's decision. It 
should also be noted that in the Dubois case the trial court had ordered that the party who had 
received a smaller share of the property pay the other party's attorney's fees. 
In Dubois the Court of Appeals reduced the alimony because it appeared to that Court that 
the income from the assets awarded to the wife were sufficient to maintain her in the manner to 
which she was accustomed without periodic payments from the Defendant. Therefore, in the 
absence of any specific analysis of the facts by the Court of Appeals in the Dubois case, the 
Defendant's reliance on that case for the proposition that the trial court in this matter abused his 
discretion is misplaced, especially where Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees in this case was 
denied in light of the property division. 
While the case of Read v. Read 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) does quite clearly indicate that 
awarding the wife 90% of the marital estate may not be appropriate, it does not stand for the 
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proposition that to do so in this case would be improper. 
In Read the Supreme Court was concerned that the trial court's unequal division of 
property appeared to reflect "a degree of punishment against the Defendant for his extra-marital 
conduct and relative "guilt" in bringing about the dissolution of the marriage." Read, 594 P.2d at 
872. The Supreme Court, in addressing that concern, stated that, while the trial court "must 
consider many factors in making a property settlement in a divorce proceeding... the purpose of 
the settlement should not be to impose punishment upon either party." Read. 594 P.2d at 872. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that, while the trial court "may, and as a practical matter 
invariably does, consider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their marriage vows, 
and their relative guilt or innocence in causing the break-up of the marriage,... there is no 
authority in our law for administering punitive measures in a divorce judgement, and that to do 
so would be improper,..." Read. 594 P.2d at 872. Therefore, while the relative loyalty or the 
disloyalty of the parties to their marriage vows is a factor the trial court can consider in 
fashioning it's decree, it may not administer punitive measures in a divorce judgement. 
In Read the Supreme Court focused it's attention on the trial court's "duty to consider the 
various factors relating to the situation and to arrange the best possible allocation of the property 
and the economic resources of the parties so that the parties and their children can pursue their 
lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible." Read. 594 P.2d at 874. 
In Read the Supreme Court concluded that the division of property under those 
circumstance was too disparate and that the decree should be modified. The Court pointed out a 
number of inconsistencies and unresolved questions in the case and remanded the matter to the 
trial court for further hearing. 
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It is important to note that, in Read, there is no mention of the factors unique to this case 
i.e., (1) the Defendant's substantial inheritance, (2) the Plaintiffs need for additional income 
which at least one of the assets awarded to her was intended to provide, or (3) the Defendant's 
dissipating of a clearly marital asset, his retirement. 
While a 90% award of marital property to the wife in Read was determined to be 
inappropriate, such an award in this case is entirely proper. 
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THIS COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE RANCH AND APPROPRIATELY 
CONSIDERED IT IN ITS AWARD 
As this Court pointed out in Jefferies v. Jefferies 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Court of Appeals 1995), 
" First, all assets acquired by the parties during the marriage are to be considered by the 
trial court when making an equitable distribution, unless the law specifically prevents the 
trial court from considering a particular asset. Second, a marital asset is defined as any 
right that has accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit." Jefferies, 894 
P.2d at 837. 
Clearly, the trial court should consider not only present but future benefits as well if those 
benefit's have accrued during the marriage. 
Here, the Defendant's entitlement to a share of his mother's estate accrued during the 
marriage. She died in 1991. The Defendant had included his interest in his Mother's estate in 
the family financial statements in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. Title to the Mountain Meadows 
Ranch had already been deeded to the Defendant prior to the filing of the Complaint for Divorce. 
Defendant had title in February of 1995. There was apparently a problem with the chain of title, 
subsequently remedied, and a new deed was issued in February of 1997. This, however, does not 
change the fact that the Defendant's interest in that property, although perhaps not technically a 
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present benefit, was a future benefit that had accrued during the marriage. 
The Defendant testified at trial that it was his "understanding that [he] would receive that 
acreage,..., as [his] share of the estate" (R. 651, 652). 
It would have been error for the trial court to have ignored the Defendant's interest in that 
asset because of a mere defect in the chain of title which has subsequently been remedied. 
VII. 
ALIMONY WAS APPROPRIATELY AWARDED IN THIS ACTION 
In this case the Plaintiff does not have sufficient assets with which to meet her needs. As 
she testified at trial, her financial need each month, even without a car or a house payment, is 
approximately $2,021.00. She is able to earn $540.00. The award of the home to the Plaintiff, 
free and clear of any debt, would permit her to generate approximately $850.00 per month as 
rental income to supplement those earnings. However, she still falls more than $600.00 short of 
being able to meet her needs each month. She, therefore, is in need of financial assistance from 
the Defendant in the form of alimony. The award of $600.00 per month until the 22 acres sells is 
clearly intended to assist her in meeting that need and was appropriate under the circumstances. 
The Defendant, on the other hand, was found by the trial court to be capable of earning 
$3,000.00 per month with monthly expenses of $2,400.00. These findings are appropriately and 
adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial. In addition, although there is no mention 
of this fact by the trial court in it's findings, the Defendant's current spouse does contribute 
toward the payment of his living expenses. 
Assuming that the trial court's finding that the Defendant has the ability to produce 
income in the amount of $3,000.00 per month is correct, the award of alimony is entirely 
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appropriate, the trial court having considered all of the factors required by the prior decisions of 
the appellate Courts in this State, to wit, "(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income and; (3) the ability 
of the supporting spouse to provide support." Godfrey v. Godfrey, 853 P.2d 589 (Utah App. 
1993). The trial court properly considered all of those factors and the award of alimony is 
consistent with that court's findings in that regard. 
While it is true that certain assets were awarded by the trial court to the Plaintiff which 
could reduce her need for spousal support, the trial court properly took into account those assets 
in fashioning it's award of alimony. The trial court ruled that, upon the sale of the 22 acres, 
which the parties expected would net to each of them a substantial amount of money, the 
Defendant's support obligation to the Plaintiff should decrease. That ruling is entirely consistent 
with the trial court's findings and the law in this state regarding the issue of alimony. 
VIII. 
INCOME WAS PROPERLY IMPUTED TO THE DEFENDANT 
A.Defendant is capable of paying alimony to Plaintiff. 
Income should have and properly was imputed to the Defendant in this case. The Defendant was 
clearly voluntarily under employed. He acknowledged that he resigned his employment. He 
stated that he could "could have gone back to teaching" but he refused to do so. His attorney 
acknowledged that Defendant "probably could have that job back." (R. 604). 
In 1995 and 1996, right after the Divorce Decree was filed, and while the Defendant was 
furthering his relationship with the woman who eventually became his wife and beginning a 
business with her, the Defendant requested and obtained a leave of absence from his job of 17 
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years as a teacher in the Washington County School District, where he had, during the previous 
year, earned in excess of $50,000.00. His request for leave of absence was granted even though 
he had already started teaching that year. 
Prior to the 1996-1997 school year the Defendant attended a faculty meeting. After the faculty 
meeting and prior to school starting the Defendant met with his supervisor, Don Fawson, and 
requested another leave of absence for the 1996-1997 school year, citing, as his only reason for 
requesting the leave of absence, the divorce. He did not mention any health problems or other 
reasons that Mr. Fawson could recall. When Mr. Fawson informed the Defendant that he would 
not be granted another leave of absence the Defendant quit. 
B.Failure to make a specific finding of unemployment or underemployment is not 
fatal to the trial court's decision. 
A trial court should make a specific finding of voluntarily unemployment or under employment 
prior to imputing income. However, such a finding is not essential in order to sustain a trial 
court's decision to impute income to a party. 
UCA § 78-45-7 (a) states as follows: 
"Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed." 
This however does not require that the trial court use any specific words to reflect a finding of 
unemployment or underemployment. 
In Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993) the Court of Appeals stated that "Section (7) (a) 
[of UCA § 78-45. 7.5]does not specifically require a trial court, in making a "finding" of under 
employment, to parrot the exact language of the statute,..." HalL 858 P.2d at 1024. 
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In Hall the trial court not only failed to enter any explicit findings that the parent was under 
employed but failed to make any "subsidiary findings that point to such a determination having 
been implicitly made." Hall. 858 P.2d at 1024. In this case, unlike in Hall, the trial court did 
make "subsidiary findings that point to such a determination having been implicitly made." The 
Defendant voluntarily left his employment while the divorce proceedings were pending and 
refused to return to that employment even thought the job was still available at which he would 
have earned at least $3,000.00 per month. 
Although the Defendant had had heart bi-pass surgery in 1988, there was absolutely no evidence 
at trial to indicate that Defendant terminated his employment because of health problems. He 
had worked several years after the heart bi-pass surgery and no evidence was presented at trial 
that he had any resulting health problems. 
It is true that the trial court did not specifically state that the Defendant was voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. However, the trial court did find that "in 1995 the Defendant 
took a leave of absence from the Washington County School District, but did not return to that 
employment thereafter." (R. 502). 
The trial court also found that "Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment on the eve of 
full retirement. His doing so deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income and the benefit of 
his retirement account had he worked until he became entitled to full retirement benefits." (R. 
508). 
The Defendant left his wife of 38 years and terminated his employment voluntarily, electing to 
pursue another direction in life which provided him with far less income than he could have 
earned had he taken advantage of the income producing opportunity available to him as a teacher 
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in the Washington County School District with over 17 years experience in that district and 12 
years experience in the State of California. 
In order for the the trial court to find that a party is voluntarily under employed, that court need 
not find that that party is acting in bad faith. In this case, the trial court found that the Defendant 
was "working hard to make [High Desert Marine] profitable and also to make the Arma-Coating 
business equally profitable." (R. 505). All that is required to impute income to a parent in 
calculating child support is to find that the "parent is voluntarily unemployed or under 
employed." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a). The trial court properly considered the factors 
enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(b) in imputing income to the Defendant, 
including his "employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupational qualifications, and prevailing earnings from persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community." UCA § 78-45-7.5(7)(b). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the Defendant's failure to "marshal all the evidence" the trial court's factual 
findings are assumed correct and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
In this case the trial court properly awarded to the Defendant his separate, inherited family 
ranch, having a value of $775,000.00, free and clear of any debt. After doing so, the trial court 
did not divide the balance of the marital estate according to any strict mathematical formula but, 
instead, considered all pertinent factors in awarding to the Plaintiff a greater share of the marital 
estate then had been awarded to the Defendant. Taking into account assets dissipated by the 
Defendant, this resulted in the Plaintiff receiving approximately 90% of the marital estate. That 
award, however, is not inappropriately disparate or inequitable. The trial court's award of 
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marital property properly takes into account all of the factors, including income generating assets 
awarded to the Plaintiff to assist her in meeting her financial needs and requiring that she pay her 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this proceeding. The Defendant's request that the parties' 
marital estate be divided according to a strict mathematical formula of 50% to each is 
inconsistent with the law of this state with reference to property division in divorce cases, 
especially divorce cases of nearly forty years, and inconsistent with the facts and evidence 
presented, including the parties' respective abilities to pursue their lives in as happy and useful 
manner as possible after the divorce. 
Plaintiff was awarded substantial property, and, upon liquidation of that property, will 
have assets to further contribute toward her support. However until those assets are liquidated, 
the Plaintiff is clearly in need of financial support from the Defendant even if the Defendant were 
to comply with the requirement that he service the marital debt so that rent from the marital 
home would be available to the Plaintiff to assist in meeting her needs. The trial court properly 
considered all of the required factors in awarding the Plaintiff $600.00 per month alimony and in 
ordering that that alimony reduce when the 22 acres is sold. 
Simply stated, the trial court in this instance conscientiously considered all of the evidence 
in equitably dividing the parties' marital estate. The Defendant's request that the trial court 
ignore his inherited property or ignore his voluntary termination of employment and potential 
income as a school teacher or ignore the fact that the he dissipated the parties' retirement account 
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is inconsistent with principles of equity and the case law governing divorce in this state. The 
lower courts' award to the Plaintiff of the greater portion of the marital estate and his award of 
alimony to the Plaintiff is appropriate and should be sustained on appeal. 
DATED this day of. __, 1997. 
I, G. Michael Westfall, certify that on September 15th I served two copies of the attached 
Brief of Appellee upon Michael D. Hughes, the counsel for the appellant in this matter, by 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Michael D. Hughes 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §30-3-5(l),(7) 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependant children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care 
insurance for the dependant children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint 
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and 
regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 4; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after January 1, 
1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order assessing against the 
obligor an additional $7 per month check processing fee to be included in the 
amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the 
Department of Human Services for the purposes of income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipients's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a),. 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principals and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of 
living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change 
in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the 
amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not forseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipients that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the 
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of the subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justified that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years 
that the marriage existed unless, at the time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-7.5(7)(a) 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal 
minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a 
judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in a administrative proceeding shall enter 
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care of the parents' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn 
minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job 
skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's 
presence in the home. 
A. 3 
RULE 52(c), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
52(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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Stevens 22 Rifle 1950 
Remington 308 Rifle 1957 
270 Winchester Rifle 1993 
Muzzle loader 1986 
Belt Derringer 1970s 
S&W 357 Magnum 1980s 
Revolver 
TOTAL $9,058.00 
19. Pursuant to the last will and testament of his parents, Defendant is to inherit 
certain real property known as the Mountain Meadows Ranch, consisting of approximately 745 
acres, as identified in Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 33. At the time of the divorce and at the time of 
trial. Defendant had not obtained title to said property and his interest therein was an expectancy 
only. That property has a value of approximately $775,000.00, for purposes of trial, consistent 
with the financial statement of the parties dated May 31, 1994. That property is not encumbered 
by any debt at this time. As, at the time of trial, the Defendant had no interest in the property, the 
Court has no jurisdiction to award any interest in the property to the Plaintiff. Any interest 
which the Defendant may have in said property is his separate property, and is awarded to him as 
his sole and separate property, and is wholly non-marital in nature. 
20. The Mountain Meadows Ranch produces no income and its upkeep and 
maintenance costs exceed the income derived therefrom. Said property has been in the Lytle 
family for several generations and the Defendant has no intention of selling or encumbering the 
property during his lifetime. His intention is to deed the property to his children upon his death. 
Premarital 30.00 
Gift from Myrlene 200.00 
Gift from Myrlene 200.00 
Gift from Myrlene ? 
Gift from Myrlene 75.00 
Gift from Michelle 250.00 
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CLINTON EZRA LYTLE, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 954500316 
Judge James L. Shumate 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 10th day of October, 1996, before the Court, 
sitting without a jury, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding, 
the Plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by her counsel, G. Michael Westfall, of Gallian, 
Westfall. Wilcox and Wright, and the Defendant appearing in person and being represented by his 
counsel, Samuel G. Draper, of Hughes & Read, and the Court having granted Defendant's motion to 
bifurcate, and a decree of divorce having been entered on or about September 8, 1995, reserving the 
issues of support, property division, and attorney's fees for determination at trial, and the Court having 
heard the evidence offered by the parties admitted herein, and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT MAKES AND ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
FINPfNG* OF FACT 
:;;;TY 
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1. The parties were married on the 2nd of March, 1957, and were divorced on the 8th of 
September, 1995, under a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce. 
2. During the parties' marriage, the Defendant taught school in California. 
3. Thereafter the family moved to Utah where the Defendant worked for approximately 7 
years for his father in the ranching operation and then began teaching school where he taught within the 
Washington County School District for a period of 17 years, while also during that period of time 
working on a ranching operation with his father, and after his father's death, he continued to work the 
ranching operation. 
4. In 1995 the Defendant took a leave of absence from the Washington County School 
District, but did not return to that employment thereafter. 
5. Prior to his leave of absence, he had earned as much as $4,000.00 per month. 
6. At the time of his leave of absence, his income earning capacity, in view of his 
experience, his age, and his health, including cardiac problems in 1988 and surgery at that time, the 
Court finds that the Defendant's earning capacity was $3,000.00 per month. 
7. During the term of the marriage, the Plaintiff raised the family, assisted the Defendant on 
the ranch, kept the house, bottled fruit, helped in the ranching operation, and generally supported both 
parties' economic efforts in making the marriage and the family operation work. 
8. The parties have substantial assets, but received almost all of the present-day wealth from 
the Defendant's parents in the forms of gifts of real estate, either by inheritance, or out-right gift during 
the term of the marriage. 
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9. However, on top of those gifts, their joint efforts of producing income and, also, in non-
dollar producing efforts, but valuable efforts, contributed by the Plaintiff, Mrs. Lytle, added to the values 
produced by the gifts and inheritance from the Defendant's father and mother. 
10. Their life style prior to the marriage was not lavish, but certainly comfortable. 
11. They were able to obtain and have new cars; take trips and short vacations; dine out on 
regular basis; acquire fur and some amounts of jewelry for the Plaintiff; and the Defendant was able to 
continue an uneconomic, what the Court would describe as a hobby, ranching operation on the property 
at Mountain Meadow. 
12. Since the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff has taken employment at J.C. Penny's where 
she is able to produce about $540.00 per month. 
13. Since the time of the divorce, the Defendant withdrew $56,015.00 from his retirement 
account. 
14. That is a net to him, as a substantial portion for taxes was retained. 
15. The Defendant made the choice to use that money to refinance the Arma Coating 
business and also put a substantial down payment on the Condominium which the Plaintiff is now 
occupying. 
16. The Court determines that Defendant did that voluntarily, but acknowledges the 
responsibility that he felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a manner appropriate 
to her standard of living. 
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17. Allegations of adultery have been made in this matter, but as the Court has previously 
ruled that is not proven by the burden of proof required. 
18. At the present setting, the Plaintiff remains single, living in her condominium, working at 
Penny's, and unable to meet her needs at the present time with anywhere near the level that had been 
hers during the term of the marriage, and her ability to meet her needs now falls short of her actual 
needs. 
19. Since the time of the divorce the Defendant has remarried, is living at his wife's home, 
and is working more than full-time at the two businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as Hi-Desert 
Marine, and the Arma Coating business, and is making a good-faith and genuine effort to produce 
income at the same or hopefully even above the levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching. 
20. The Plaintiffs expenses are $2,000.00 per month. 
21. The Court finds that the Defendant's reasonable expenses are $2,400.00 a month. 
22. The debt on the Cadillac has now been paid, and is no longer an obligation. 
23. The Corvette, which is included in Defendant's claims for expenses, is a drain upon the 
parties assets and is an unaffordable luxury with its high insurance and monthly payment which should 
be sold. 
24. At the present time, the Plaintiff and Defendant jointly own the business, Hi-Desert 
Marine, which the Court finds has a negative net value. 
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25. The net value affixed by the Court is somewhat less than the accounting testimony at the 
time of trial, but the Court is convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the net value of Hi-
Desert Marine is in the neighborhood of negative $150,000.00. 
26. That business, while all the parties agree should be awarded to Mr. Lytle, has a negative 
impact on the balance sheet of $150,000.00. 
27. The Defendant has run Hi-Desert Marine, paid the parties' son and supported their son 
and his family from that obligation, has tried to get enough money out of it to pay the temporary orders 
of support which the Court has made, and has tried to make some money himself. 
28. The Defendant has attended training and has relocated the business. 
29. The Court is convinced that Mr. Lytle is working hard to make that business profitable 
and also to make the Arma Coating business equally profitable. 
30. The Court finds that Arma Coating's net worth is about $0, but has had the ability to 
generate some income and acquire some assets. 
31. The Arma Coating business was acquired by an initial investments of $55,000.00, which 
was borrowed, but that was refinanced with some of the money from Defendant's retirement and some of 
the money from the Defendant's inheritance. 
32. At the present time, the parties have the following assets with the following stipulated 
values: 
a. The home and lot located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, is worth 
$149,500.00 and is more particularly described as follows: 
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Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42 
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East 
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
b. The condo on 489 Ridgeview Drive, St. George, is worth $135,000.00, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat T \ a Planned Unit Development 
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder. 
c. The building lot lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black 
Hill in St. George, Utah, is worth $35,000, and is more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record. 
d. The 22 acres of real estate development property has a gross value of 
$836,000.00, but because of the low basis in this property held by the parties, upon its sale an 
approximately $202,000.00 tax impact will be realized, so the net value of the development property is 
$634,000.00. 
e. There is a possibility of an asset in Carson City, Nevada, but the parties have 
agreed to split that evenly, half and half, if there is anything there, which appears unlikely. 
33. The Mountain Meadows Ranch has a value of $775,000.00. 
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34. The personal property of the parties has been divided between them by agreement with 
the exception that the Bearcat Pistol which is to go to the Defendant. 
35. The Defendant should receive the Corvette vehicle and personal property in his 
possession. 
36. He also should receive the $7,000.00 worth of cattle. 
37. The Plaintiff should receive her Cadillac and the other personal property in her 
possession. 
38. The Court finds the value of the personal property received by the Plaintiff is $ 16,725.00. 
The Court finds that exceeds her estimate by $2,000.00, because it is the Court's finding that the large 
ring that she has is worth more than was estimated by her. 
39. The Defendant's personal property is worth $54,000.00. That is based upon a higher 
estimate than the Defendant made because the Court finds that the value of the boat was higher than was 
estimated by the Defendant. 
40. The debts of the parties are: 
a. The first mortgage on the home on Lytle Drive is $20,009.83. 
b. The home equity loan on that home is $16,039.58. 
c. The condo note and also a note secured as a third mortgage on the home, is for 
$149,574.69. 
The note on the Corvette is $9,767.32. 
There are accountants fees in the amount of $10,546.00 
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I The parties have agreed that if there are any debts due on the special improvement 
district near the home, that they will divide that debt half and half. 
41. Looking at the debt obligation, the income producing ability of the Defendant, and the 
property available to the Plaintiff by the Court's decree, the Court, looking at the needs of the parties and 
finding that the Defendant has needs of $2,400.00 per month and has the ability to produce income at 
$3,000.00 a month, and looking at the Plaintiffs ability to produce income, with her needs of $2,000.00 
a month and her receiving $540.00 from employment, and finding that a reasonable rental value for the 
home is $850.00 for a month, which the Court anticipates will generate some income for the Plaintiff, 
and considering that the Plaintiff also has the building lot which is probably something that she could 
sell and live off of for quite a while and maybe not even have to work for a period of time, depending on 
how the development property is sold, the Court finds that a reasonable figure for alimony is a sum of 
$600.00 per month until the development property sells. 
42. Attorney's fees for the Plaintiff are $15,968.00. Attorney's fees for the Defendant have 
been $12,835.00 and the Court finds both these to be reasonable, and the Court complements counsel on 
their work, not only the quality of their work, but the level of their fees in view of the size of this estate. 
43. The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment on the eve of full retirement. His 
doing so deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement account had 
he worked until he became entitled to full retirement benefits. 
44. The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court Order, liquidated his retirement 
account. Although some of those funds were used to assist the Plaintiff with reference to acquisition of 
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her condominium, most of the funds were used to pay a debt incurred in conjunction with the 
Defendant's opening a business against the Plaintiffs will, while the parties were still married, as asset 
which, according to the Court's findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant dissipated almost 
all of that retirement account. Plaintiff should receive a greater share of the balance of the marital estate. 
45- The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at the standard of living to which she is 
entitled with the amount of alimony awarded by the Court and her own earned income. According to the 
trial Court's findings, although the Defendant would have sufficient income to meet his needs by paying 
$600.00 per month to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of alimony, still falls 
approximately $900.00 short each month of being able to meet her financial needs. 
46. Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have acquired a financial interest in the 
Mountain Meadows Ranch because of work she performed on that property during the parties' marriage 
and while it was still titled in the name of the Defendant's parents, equitably, her contribution toward 
that asset ought to be considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marital property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
47. The ranch is awarded to Defendant. 
48. The condominium and home and lot are awarded to Plaintiff. 
49. Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the 
exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant. 
50. Defendant shall assume the debts of the parties. 
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51. Defendant shall receive I li-Dcsert Marine, subject to the encumbrances and debts 
thereon, and the Anna Coating business, subject to the encumbrances and debts thereon. 
52. Plainitiff shall be indemnified by Defendant so that the assets that she receives shall be 
free and clear, which is not the case right now. The Court anticipates that when the development 
pioperty sells, that will be the case. At that time, the parties can get out of debt and get some peace in 
their lives. 
53. The development property shall be equally divided between the parties. An uiulix iilal 
one-half interest is awarded to each, and it should be sold as quickly as possible, and as quickly as is 
reasonable. 
54. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony of $600.00 per month until the development property 
sells. 
55. Upon the sale of the development properly, alimony shall be reduce to the sum of 
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56. In view of the division of the properties and the economic circumstance of the parties, it 
would be error for the Court to require either party to pay the others attorney's fees and costs; therefore, 
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this h day of February; 1997 
BYTH 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND-CONTENT. 
^MK5HAEL WESTFAU/ 
GALLIAN, A^ESTFAIXWILCOX AND WRIGHT 
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Amended Judgment in re: Alimony, Property Division,"Debt 
Allocation, and Attorneys Fees , 3 7 flfiy g PR 12 0 6 
BY 
SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar No. 7050) 
HUGHES & READ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801)673-4892 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 




CLINTON EZRA LYTLE, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN RE: 
ALIMONY, PROPERTY 
DIVISION, DEBT ALLOCATION, 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 954500316 
Judge James L. Shumate 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for trial on the 10th day of October, 1996, before the Court, 
sitting without a jury, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding, 
the Plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by her counsel, G. Michael Westfall, of Gallian. 
Westfall, Wilcox and Wright, and the Defendant appearing in person and being represented by his 
counsel, Samuel G. Draper, of Hughes & Read, and the Court having granted Defendant's motion to 
bifurcate, and a decree of divorce having been entered on or about September 8, 1995, reserving the 
issues of support, property division, and attorney's fees for determination at trial, and the Court having 
heard the evidence offered by the parties admitted herein, and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES THAT: 
1. The Mountain Meadows Ranc&is aBdarded to Defendant. 
£ 
2. The following real property is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property. 
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to the same and as between Plaintiff and Defendant: 
a. The condominium located at 489 North Ridgeview Drive, St. George, 84770, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat T \ a Planned Unit Development, 
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder. 
b. The home located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, Utah 84770, more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42 
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East 
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
c. The building lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black 
Hill in St. George, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record. 
3. Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the 
exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant. 
4. Should the parties own an asset in Carson City, Nevada, which at the time of trial 
appeared unlikely, the parties are each awarded one-half interest therein. 
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2. The following real property is awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant to the same and as between Plaintiff and Defendant: 
a. The condominium located at 489 North Ridgeview Drive, St. George, 84770, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of 314, The Ridge At St. George Plat T \ a Planned Unit Development, 
according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Washington 
County Recorder. 
b. The home located at 2076 West Lytle Drive, St. George, Utah 84770, more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet North of the Southeast Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW 1/4 SE 1/4 ) of Section 10, Township 42 
South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
100.00 feet along the East line of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW 1/4 SE 1/4); thence West 120.00 feet; thence South 100.00 feet; thence East 
120.00 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
c. The building lot located in the Valley View Heights Subdivision, on the Black 
Hill in St. George, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 311 of Valley View Heights #3 Subdivision, a recorded Subdivision in 
the Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
SUBJECT to Easements, Restrictions and Reservations of Record. 
3. Each party is awarded such personal property as is in his or her possession, with the 
exception of the Bearcat pistol, which is awarded to the Defendant. 
4. Should the parties own an asset in Carson City, Nevada, which at the time of trial 
appeared unlikely, the parties are each awarded a one-half interest therein. 
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5. Defendant shall assume the debts of the parties. 
6. If there are any debts due on the special improvement district near the home, the same 
will be divided equally between the parties. 
7. Defendant shall receive Hi-Desert Marine, subject to the encumbrances and debts 
thereon, and the Arma Coating business, subject to the encumbrances and debts thereon. 
8. Plaintiff shall be indemnified by Defendant so that the assets that she receives shall be 
free and clear, which is not the case right now. The Court anticipates that when the development 
property sells, that will be the case. At that time, the parties can get out of debt and get some peace in 
their lives. 
9. The development property shall be equally divided between the parties. An undivided 
one-half interest is awarded to each, and it should be sold as quickly as possible, and as quickly as is 
reasonable. 
10. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony of $600.00 per month until the development property 
sells. 
11. Upon the sale of the development property, alimony shall be reduce to the sum of 
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12. In view of the division of the properties and the economic circumstance of the parties, it 
would be error for the Court to require either party to pay the others attorney's fees and costs; therefore, 
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this c ; day of^ebrtrar/1997 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND C O N T E N l ^ s ^ V o x & 
G, MI£HAEL^E%TFXLL 
T}ALLIAN, WESTFATL, WILCOX AND WRIGHT 
LYTLE v. LYTLE 




Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order Supplementing 
Findings of Fact 
rf-
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #34 34 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 




CLINTON EZRA LYTLE, 
Defendant 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
SUPPLEMENTING FINDINGS OF 
FACT 
Civil No. 954500316 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on 
Tuesday, the 25th day of March, 1997 on the Defendant's Motion to 
(l) Amend or Make Additional Findings, (2) Amend or Alter Judgment, 
and (3) For a New Trial and Supporting Memorandum and on the 
Plaintiff's response to that motion. The Plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by her counsel of record, G. Michael 
Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by his counsel 
of record, Samuel G. Draper and Michael D. Hughes of the lav/ firm 
of HUGHES & READ. Counsel for both parties were heard with 
reference to the Defendant's pending motion and the Plaintiff's 
OS^dBSBytBfftMatifietfSfi.11^ T r i a 1 ' 0 r d e r D e nY i nS Defendant's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order Supplementing 
Finding©ldfiwfagtthe presentation of oral argument and review of the 
pleadings on file, including the legal authority cited, the Court 
made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based 
thereon the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
2. The Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is 
denied. 
3. The Findings of Fact of the Court, entered on March 3, 
1997, are hereby amended and the following findings, included in the 
amended Findings of Fact: 
a) The Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment 
on the eve of full retirement. His doing so deprived the Plaintiff 
of the benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement 
account had he worked until he became entitled to full retirement 
benefits. 
b) The Defendant, in violation of a then existing Court 
Order liquidated his retirement account. Although some of those 
funds were used to assist the Plaintiff with reference to 
acquisition of her condominium, most of the funds were used to pay 
a debt incurred in conjunction with the Defendant's opening a 
business against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were still 
married, an asset which, according to the Court's findings, now has 
no value. In essence, the Defendant dissipated almost all of that 
retirement account. Plaintiff should receive a greater share of 
the balance of the marital estate. 
2 
c) The Plaintiff is clearly unable to support herself at 
the standard of living to which she is entitled with the amount of 
alimony awarded by the Court and her own earned income. According 
to the trial Court's findings, although the Defendant would have 
sufficient income to meet his needs by paying $600.00 per month to 
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, even with that $600.00 of alimony, 
still falls approximately $900.00 short each month of being able to 
meet her financial needs. 
d) Although, technically, the Plaintiff may not have 
acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows Ranch because 
of work she performed on that property during the parties* marriage 
and while it was still titled in the name of the Defendant's 
parents, equitably, her contribution toward that asset ought to be 
considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marita] 
property. 
DATED this 2 J) day of / V ? *l \/ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT £ QF (jf 
— J ^ J C u 1 ^»4T—V-* 
James I*. Shumate ^ ., • 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d t f e / ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM *ftHSMJlJHL1M IT N .< 
,
/4z*z<c<ccsJ2 S^Xcy<2 
Samuel G. Draper 
Attorney for Defendant 
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